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Abstract.  A principle, according to which any scientific 
theory can be mathematized, is investigated. Social science, 
liberal arts, history, and philosophy are meant first of all. 
That kind of theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, 
which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain 
mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term 
“theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as 
already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible 
proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be accepted 
rather a metamathematical axiom about the relation of 
mathematics and reality. 
The main statement is formulated as follows: Any scientific 
theory admits isomorphism to some mathematical structure in 
a way constructive (that is not as a proof of “pure existence” 
in a mathematical sense).  
Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s 
phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of 
“bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano 
arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of 
mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the 
generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the 
axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. 
The sketch of the proof is organized in five steps: (1) a 
generalization of epoché; (2) involving transfinite induction in 
the transition between Peano arithmetic and set theory; (3) 
discussing the finiteness of Peano arithmetic; (4) applying 
transfinite induction to Peano arithmetic; (5) discussing an 
arithmetical model of reality. 
Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of 
mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation 
to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include 
reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two 
kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert 
mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof 
of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano 
arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert 
mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that 
the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the 
principle is an independent axiom. 
The present paper follows a pathway grounded on 
Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve 
the generalized arithmetic necessary for the principle to be 
founded in alternative ontology, in which there is no reality 
external to mathematics: reality is included within 
mathematics. That latter mathematics is able to self-found 
itself and can be called Hilbert mathematics in honour of 
Hilbert’s program for self-founding mathematics on the base 
of arithmetic. 
The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent 
to Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. 
Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the 
problem which mathematics refers to our being; and vice 
versa: the choice between them for different reasons would 
confirm or refuse the principle as to the being. 
An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics  
is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. The 
Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics is involved to 
illustrate that ontology. Thus the problem which of the two 
mathematics is more relevant to our being (rather than reality 
for reality is external only to Gödel mathematics) is discussed 
again in a new way 
 A few directions for future work can be: a rigorous formal 
proof of the principle as an independent axiom; the further 
development of information ontology consistent to both kinds 
of mathematics, but much more natural for Hilbert 
mathematics; the development of the information 
interpretation of quantum mechanics as a mathematical one 
for information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics; the 
description of consciousness in terms of information ontology.      
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The research of first principles of all being conditioned the 
beginning of philosophy in Ancient Greece many millennia 
before the experimental science of the modern age. Euclid’s 
geometry was built successfully for decades of centuries 
starting from a few axioms and postulates and deducing all 
rest statements in it as theorems logically. Thus philosophy 
and geometry created a paradigm for constructing science 
from first principles, conserved until now. 
The introduction of first principles independently of their 
relevance, from which the rest statements can be logically or 
otherwise deduced, completes the logical structure of the 
investigated area giving it the mathematical structure of lattice 
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and thus, of both logic and ontology: Indeed, the first 
principles are the least element of the lattice, and the being as 
a whole or at least the investigated area is its biggest element.  
Physics utilizing the method “by first principles” obtained 
a mathematical form. Nowadays, the boundary between 
physical theories and applied mathematics seems not to be 
different from that between mathematical structures and their 
interpretations. Some other sciences tried to follow the model 
of physics more or less successfully. However, other sciences, 
mainly in the scope of liberal arts, history, and philosophy 
implicitly or explicitly refuted the way of mathematization in 
principle.  
On the contrary, philosophical phenomenology (Husserl’s 
doctrine, first of all) establishes an inherent link between: (a) 
logic and mathematics; (b) philosophy; (c) psychology: The 
link relates the three by means a kind of transcendental 
idealism in the German philosophical tradition. Thus a bridge 
for transfer and reinterpretation between notions of 
psychology, logic and mathematics is created under the 
necessary condition for those concepts to be considered as 
philosophical as referred to that kind of transcendental 
subject.  
One can question about the mathemazability of one (or 
any) scientific theory formally of that historical and 
conceptual background.   
Statement: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to 
some mathematical structure in a way constructive (that is not 
as a proof of “pure existence” in a mathematical sense).  
Comments of the statement: 
If any theory admits to be represented as the finite 
intension of a rather extended notion, the proof is trivial: 
Being finite, the intension can be always well-ordered to a 
single syllogism, the first element of which is interpretable as 
“first principles” (axioms): Those axioms generate a 
mathematical structure isomorphic to the theory at issue.  
If one admits the axiom of choice, any intension can be 
well-ordered even being infinite. However, then the structure 
isomorphic to the theory would exist only “purely”, which is 
practically useless. 
In fact, any theory even as a description in liberal arts, 
philosophy or history is some finite text. This does not imply, 
though, that some finite extension corresponds to it for any 
text admits links to its context unlimitedly. Properly, this third 
case is what is worth to be proved mathematically.  
A sketch of the proof:  
Its essence consists in the approach of Husserl’s 
phenomenology to be formalized and applied in both 
directions: to intension (“eidos”, “phenomenon”, intention) 
and to reality.  
(1) One can introduce “epoché” both to 
“phenomenological” and to “eidetic reduction”. As to the 
latter, it would mean the entire processes of removing one by 
one all free variables of the corresponding extension.  
(2) The induction in Peano arithmetic is not sufficient to be 
obtained the finite intension of any real thing having infinitely 
many dimensions in its extension in general: One needs 
transfinite induction (or bar induction in intuitionist 
mathematics) for that purpose in the case of “eidetic 
reduction” or the “cut-elimination rule” in the case of 
“phenomenological reduction”. 
(3) Peano arithmetic is able to generate only finite numbers. 
Indeed, the following syllogism is obvious: 
1 is finite.   
Adding 1 to any finite number, one obtains a finite number.  
Consequently, according to the axiom of induction, all 
numbers in Peano arithmetic are finite. 
(4) One can complement Peano arithmetic to a complete 
model of reality adding to it a single bit, “R”, interpretable as 
“infinity”. That single bit is also interpretable as a second 
Peano arithmetic independent of the first one. The transition 
between the two Peano arithmetics in both directions needs 
transfinite induction or its equivalent. The completeness of 
Peano arithmetic is provable by transfinite induction. 
(5) One can interpret that model of reality naturally in 
terms of Husserl’s phenomenology if “epoché” is represented 
as removing “R”: adding “R” would be the reverse operation. 
The statement, which is to be proved, can be called 
“principle of universal constructive mathematizibility”.     
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 represents a 
few traits of philosophical phenomenology and first of all, of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, which are essential to the problem 
of universal mathematization of science. Section 3 exhibits the 
main, explicit or implicit, philosophical and fundamental 
objections of liberal arts to universal mathematization.  
Section 4 demonstrates a complete enough proof of the 
statement. Section 5 offers a general philosophical 
interpretation of the principle of universal constructive 
mathemazation. Section 6 demonstrates by an example how 
the principle can be practically used for the choice of a 
relevant mathematical model. The last, 7th Section summarizes 
and generalizes the paper to a few conclusions and directions 
for future work.  
2. THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL 
MATHEMATIZATION OF SCIENCE AND 
HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY  
Set theory introduced the principle of abstraction [1] 
allowing of the generation of all elements of a set 
(interpretable as the extension of a notion) from a finite 
property featuring that set (as the definition or intension of the 
corresponding notion).  
Still the initial development of set theory generated the 
axiom of choice [2] equivalent to the so-called well-ordering 
theorem [2] or “well-ordering principle” in contemporary 
terms. According to it, any set can be mapped one-to-one into 
some subset of the set of natural numbers and thus well-
ordered. 
Semantics and semiotics of scientific theory elucidated it as 
a set of semantic units, which is well-ordered (“vocabulary of 
words”) and thus designating the investigated area of objects 
(“things”) in a way as ordered as possible, even well-ordered 
as an ideal by a one-to-one mapping between “words and 
things”. 
Scientific theory admits two kinds of exceptionally 
important formalizations: (i) as the intension of a rather 
extended notion, in which (i+ii) can be added well-ordering. 
The latter case corresponds to the deduction from first 
principles, which can be interpreted as the initial element of 
that well-ordering.  
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This construction furthermore having the formal structure 
of logic is extended from the “beginning” of our knowledge in 
the first principles to the “end” itself of the being “by itself” 
(i.e. the biggest element of the lattice). Consequently, the first 
principles would complete our cognition as both logic and 
ontology.  
The organization of knowledge in notions is much more 
economical, efficient and convenient for retaining, 
reproducing, transferring, and utilization. However, if the 
notion is as extended as a scientific theory, it is too huge even 
as a notion and needs a secondary compression to first 
principles and rules of deduction.  
The organization by first principles being a secondary 
ordering refers to some description or definition of a notion, 
which can be a fiction or description of non-existing objects. 
Both notion about real things (or facts) and fiction can be 
equally well deduced from or compressed to first principles.  
Thus that organization turns out to be especially relevant to 
mathematics. 
Philosophical phenomenology starting from Brentano and 
Husserl introduced (or restored from scholastic philosophy) 
the conception about intentionality of consciousness [3-8]. 
Especially Husserl being a mathematician in education and 
early carrier linked that fundamental and definitive property 
of consciousness to the essence of mathematical cognition by 
means of the concept of “epoché” [7, 9]:  
Indeed, mathematical cognition remains open the problem 
whether the described and investigated objects exist or not. In 
other words, mathematical cognition is invariant to and thus 
independent of the existence (“reality”) or non-existence of its 
objects.  
Thus attention turns out to be dual to the phenomenological 
“intention” [10-11] in a sense: It postulates its objects as real 
independently of whether they exist or not. So, the attention 
and intention constitutes a dual pair in dependence on whether 
the objects at issue are declared as real or not (here “not” does 
not mean for them to be declared as unreal or nonexisting, but 
that they might be real or unreal).  
Then one can speak of “attention” as the reverse operation 
to “epoché”: The latter takes or removes reality, and the 
former gives or adds reality. Thus attention being inherently 
linked to the problem of reality turns out to be a fundamental 
philosophical concept rather than only a psychological one. 
For example, if the operation of that philosophical “attention” 
is applied to any intention, one would obtain the 
corresponding “idea” or “eidos” (i.e. appearance as a whole) 
in a Platonic sense, i.e. as “reell”. 
Furthermore, “intention” has another counterpart, 
“intension” in logic, mathematics, epistemology, and 
cognitive science [10]. Intension is what is able to constitute 
unambiguously a separated unit such as a notion, set, image, 
or any unit of cognition by a finite definition, i.e. by a finite 
set of bound variables interpretable as the logical constant of 
that unit. An extension as the collection of objects, each of 
which satisfies the definition at issue, corresponds to any 
intension possibly as an empty one if the definition is 
contradictory. The collection may include as existing as 
nonexisting individuals.  
One can introduce the concept of “attension” as to any unit 
enumerated above, e.g. as to a notion. It means both all 
individuals of the extension as existing and their wholeness as 
existing, too. Thus “attension” is relative to “intension” and 
“extension”, on the one hand, and to the Platonic “idea” and 
“eidos”, on the other hand. Furthermore, “attension” can be 
defined as the application of the “philosophical attention” to 
any explicit or implicit (e.g. contextual) intension. 
Attension complements intension to the pair of both biggest 
and least element of the mathematical structure of lattice 
extended from the intention of consciousness to the idea 
therefore giving both logical and ontological structure of the 
notion or whatever else unit. That structure orders the 
extension in question in a potential taxonomy (i.e. 
classification of genera and species), the biggest element of 
which, i.e. the idea of the thing defined by the extension or 
even that thing itself or by itself, is generated just by the 
philosophical attention as the corresponding attension.   
On the contrary, if the notion or unit is supplied as usual by 
any logical or ontological structure, thus its attension is 
implicitly certain, too.   
The initial research of Husserl about the psychological 
foundation of arithmetic (1887-1891) [13-14] leaded him to 
opposite conclusion in the later “Logical Investigations” 
(1900-1901), namely that psychology (and further philosophy) 
should be underlain rather by logic and mathematics.  
In fact, the initial base of that synthesis can be found even 
in Ancient Greece in Pythagoreanism, in the origin itself of 
philosophy, and a little later, in Plato’s doctrine and Euclid’s 
geometry. The German idealism including the subject and 
mind as a fundamental philosophical category had been what 
allowed of Husserl to add psychology in that huge synthesis.  
The link in question is grounded in the way of cognition in 
logic and mathematics, philosophy, and the seen in thus 
psychology rather than in any reference to reality, to 
experienced or experimental data for the reality itself should 
be inferred in particular by the new approach of 
phenomenology: This suggests for reality not to be 
presupposed, but to be “bracketed” initially [7, 9].  
Indeed, logic and mathematics do not connect the concept 
of truth, in their framework, to any confirmation by external 
reality. Therefore, they do not presuppose any reality, and 
their cognition is independent of reality as a hypothesis or 
premise. As to philosophy, it ought not to presuppose reality 
for the reality itself is its main problem1. At last, psychology 
should not be referred to reality as far as its object of research 
is just that being, which seems to be opposed to and thus 
separated from reality, namely mind and psychics2.  
Thus logic & mathematics, philosophy, and psychology 
need and would share a relevant method of research, which 
should be independent of the hypothesis (or axiom) of reality. 
In particular, that method cannot be experimental or ground 
on any experience in reality.  
Logic and mathematics as the most advanced ones in that 
kind of cognition can suggest its extended model and 
interpretation where “intension” would correspond to 
“intention”, and “extension” to some area of reality relevant to 
that intension at issue.  
                                                 
1 Heidegger underlay the problem of being as a deeper one [15]. 
2 Heidegger refuted this, the latter, and Husserl blamed him for 
“naturalization” [16]. 
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Then “attension” is the “extension” with reality added 
secondarily as far as reality cannot be presupposed in 
phenomenological research.  
Husserl, both mathematician and philosopher, was who 
offered a new reading of transcendentalism, mathematical in 
essence. The transcendental might be understood as the 
collection of all possibilities therefore interpreting the 
“condition of possibility” in thus. Mathematics accepts 
consistency seen as the possibility of existence as 
mathematical existence as well. The collection of all 
possibilities might be defined as a certain invariant shared by 
all possibilities at issue, obtainable by “eidetic reduction”, 
which is phenomenological in the sense of Husserl’s 
psychology, or transcendental in his philosophy. One might 
say that eidetic, phenomenological and transcendental 
reduction are only different senses (or contexts) of one and the 
same meaning [9] mapping all possibilities of a kind into their 
shared invariant. Then Husserl’s opposition of the 
phenomenological (transcendental) to the naturalistic might be 
further thought as the opposition of the set of all possibilities, 
defined by their invariant, to an arbitrary and therefore 
random element of the same set.  
For example, the system of mind-brain unifies somehow 
both aspects allowing to be described as both mind (i.e. 
phenomenologically and transcendentally) and brain (i.e. 
naturalistically). One might even postulate that kind of duality 
as the essential feature of that system, necessary for its 
relevant definition. If that is the case, and Husserl’s approach 
to the transcendental and naturalistic is used, one would need 
a certain equation of the transcendental and the naturalistic to 
define relevantly the system of mind-brain.  
The interpretation of the mind-brain system as a quantum 
system [17-19, 11] satisfies the condition for an element of a 
set to be equated to the set, and therefore that of the reduction 
whether eidetic or phenomenological, or transcendental in 
Husserl’s sense.  
Quantum mechanics being only an exemplification and 
interpretation of a much more general set including it shares 
the same property, namely, the equivalence of a set to its 
element. Then, the term “quantum system” means it in the 
sense of both quantum mechanics and generalization definable 
by that equivalence of ‘set’ and ‘element’. 
No finite and constructive element can satisfy that kind of 
equivalence. Even more, that equivalence is interpretable as a 
version of Dedekind’s definition of infinity [20], [21]. 
However, if the axiom of choice is attached, a finite, though 
unknown in principle, set equivalent one-to-one to each one 
infinite set should exist “purely” and mathematically, i.e. only 
possibly, but not ever actually. That paradoxical corollary is 
implied by Skolem’s consideration [22] of the “relativeness of 
‘set’” (1922). Thus infinity is decomposable to finiteness and 
randomness if randomness be equated to “pure” (never actual) 
possibility.   
Then by interpreting in terms of mind-brain, a random 
element of the one half of that duality would correspond to 
each one element of the other. This is equivalent to the 
suggested by Niels Bohr conception about mind-brain 
complementarity [23], [24] as a generalization of 
complementarity in quantum mechanics.  
One can interpret the “phenomena” in Husserl’s sense as 
the existences (“existentia”) of the “things themselves” or by 
themselves. Husserl rejected that approach as “naturalization” 
of his phenomenology [25-26]. Heidegger himself, though 
revising or developing far further Husserl’s phenomenology, 
refuted to be an “existentialist” [27].  
He tried to reinterpret Greek philosophy especially a few 
Pre-Socratics in that manner, in which the phenomenon (as 
“meaning it in itself by itself”) might be identified as naïvely 
as wisely with the being (inseparable from the existence) of 
each certain thing.  
The same approach of Heidegger penetrates, for example, 
his extended comment on a single fragment (B, 1) from 
Aristotle’s Physics [29]. The part in question refers to the 
concept of “Φύσις” at all, and Heidegger’s reflection 
addresses the relation of that term in Greek philosophy and 
Aristotle’s particularly to the modern European understanding 
of nature as opposed to both human being and technics. 
Heidegger’s way of interpretation merges the things and 
their Platonic “ideas” in the initial Φύσις thinkable as both 
χάος and ἀλήθεια. Heidegger means the latter as that truth 
relevant to both Greek and his philosophy: ἀλήθεια is ἀ-
λήθεια, i.e. the appearance at all from hiddenness as un-
hiddenness. That concept of truth is not underlain by any 
opposition to anything: it has not the form of the Latin 
adaequatio, the origin of which is often searched again in 
Aristotle.  
Truth as ἀ-λήθεια is phenomenon as appearance where 
being and existence are both yet and initially inseparable from 
each other. Thus truth as ἀ-λήθεια is φύσις at the same time. 
Nature is Truth before any opposition, particularly that of 
human being to nature. 
Further, the Greek τέχνη is seen in the same way rather 
than in the modern manner as creating something artificial, 
technical, which has not existed in a natural way, and even it 
might not exist in nature in principle: τέχνη cannot be the 
modern technics at all.  
On the contrary, τέχνη means the hidden essence to be 
revealed, literally the veil to be removed, and thus truth to be 
seen: τέχνη is not and cannot be opposed to φύσις, it assists 
for the human beings to be able to observe the φύσις in an 
obvious way.  
For example, a wooden chair reveals the strength and 
reliability of the tree, from which the chair has been made. 
That τέχνη is not opposed furthermore to philosophy and 
poetry: It may be thought as another, namely material way of 
philosophizing or poeticizing.  
Aristotle’s ἐντελέχεια is interpreted analogically and 
relatively to τέχνη: it means the “essence to be given at the 
end” in Heidegger’s interpretation, i.e. as the ultimate stage in 
the natural development. One may say that mankind and 
nature collaborate with each other by means correspondingly 
of τέχνη and of natural development both sharing ἐντελέχεια 
as their essence.  
What should be the Bedeutung (in the sense of Frege [30]) 
of metaphor?  
It should be equated to an equivalent proposition, e.g. as in 
“sad moon” to “The moon is sad”. However, that proposition 
is false in definition: otherwise it would not correspond to a 
metaphor. Furthermore, both false and metaphoric 
propositions share that they are wrong, but any wrong 
proposition is not a metaphor, even quite not: the metaphor is 
too rare and valuable because of that. 
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Any proposition needs to be understood nevertheless 
whether it is true or false before any Bedeudung to be 
assigned to it. However, both false and metaphoric 
propositions have been understood in advance, and thus 
understanding cannot serve as a demarcation line between 
them. Anyway, the attitude to the understanding is different 
for each of them. It is a preliminary stage as to a non-
metaphoric proposition, after which it can acquire its 
Bedeutung of being false or not. The understanding is 
absolutely sufficient as to a metaphor or metaphoric 
proposition for being definitively false.  
One can summarize: Understanding is the Bedeutung of 
metaphor, but not of false proposition.  
The Bedeutung of a false proposition is namely “false”, and 
any true proposition cannot be a metaphor or equivalent to a 
metaphor.  
The next question is naturally to be the reversed one: A 
certain understanding is granted as Bedeutung. Which is the 
proposition true to that fact, e.g. to a metaphor? 
A few preliminary notes are necessary. Human cognition 
can address as nature as culture. If the latter is the case, 
culture is put and opposed as a special kind of nature 
consisting of artefacts rather than facts and social events 
rather than phenomena. All of those kinds share the fact of 
understanding for no artefact might be created and no social 
event might happen without human understanding though they 
need not to be true to the facts or phenomena of nature. All 
culture shares understanding rather than adequacy to nature. 
Of course, some parts of culture, e.g. natural sciences can 
search for that adequacy, but they as well as the rest in culture 
share understanding fundamentally. 
Consequently, the Bedeutung of metaphor as understanding 
is essential in all cognition of culture, but not in natural 
sciences, which add a new distinction of being either false or 
true as to the understood after understanding, though they 
share understanding as a necessary (but already extremely 
insufficient for them) condition being a part of human culture. 
If hermeneutics is defined as the way (or method) of 
cognition of culture, it needs understanding as a fundamental 
concept, and the case study of metaphor may serve as a 
linguistic model or exemplification of hermeneutics.  
Philosophical hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer 
[15, 31] originated of Husserl’s phenomenology [32], which 
suggested a new approach to the philosophical problem of 
consciousness. One might deduce the understanding in culture 
from the intentionality of consciousness for both “bracket” the 
adequacy to reality therefore addressing a new kind of reality, 
human reality, and a new kind of truth, which is not grounded 
on adequacy. It is called by Heidegger Alethea [15, 33] 
“unhiddeness” and it is applicable to the Bedeutung of 
metaphor as understanding. Indeed, anything which is 
understood comes out, exits from hiddenness, appears in 
“unhiddeness” sharing truth as Alethea nevertheless whether it 
is adequate to a certain external reality or not.  
Then, which should be the proposition true to the fact that a 
certain understanding is granted as Bedeutung? The 
interpretation of “true” is ambiguous. If it is true as adequacy, 
that proposition should be equivalent to the understanding, 
e.g. as “The moon is sad” to “sad moon”.  
If it is true in the sense of Alethea, it should be  
an understanding of the understanding, a continuation in  
the same field of openness as unhiddeness (e.g. Heidegger’s 
“Lichtung” [33]). In other words, it should be a new verse 
after the verse, which is just thus understood, following 
Heidegger’s “Dichtung” [34], or a new text in the track of the 
text being understood just in thus, following Derrida’s “trace” 
[35-36].  
One can summarize that any understanding granted as 
Bedeutung can be described by one or more propositions 
adequate to the understanding as in humanities. Furthermore, 
the understanding can be understood by means of a new 
understanding, i.e. an interpretation, and thus kept, conserved 
and continued as a tradition (in Gadamer [31]).   
Particularly, Ricœur’s “true-and-false metaphor” [37], 
reminiscent of Schrödinger’s “alive-and-dead cat” [38] rather 
essentially and fruitfully, can be interpreted consistently: 
Metaphor is true as understanding, but false as adequacy. 
There is a fundamental philosophical problem about the 
relation of what is outside of consciousness to what is inside 
of consciousness. It implies that some boundaries of 
consciousness should exist in some sense to be the articulation 
of the former problem meaningful. On the contrary, the 
impossibility for that problem to be resolved is consistent to 
limitless consciousness as what is often interpreted God in 
theology.  
A rather paradoxical equivalent to limitless consciousness 
was elaborated by Heidegger, but ascribed by him to Greeks: 
If Socrates’s problem of human being had not been involved, 
therefor returning to pre-Socratics, all is being for there is not 
human being and thus any boundaries between the former and 
the latter do not exist. The concept itself of “Gegenstand” [29] 
as the opposing or being opposed to human being should be 
cancelled and erased.  
Removing the human being is absolutely inacceptable for 
theology. Theology needs human being not less than God. So 
that kind of limitless consciousness as omnipresence being at 
the expense of cancelling the problem of human being is not 
equivalent to what theology means though that is consistent to 
limitlessness after removing the borders between what is 
inside and what is outside of consciousness.  Heidegger in 
turn expressively rejected Sartre’s “Existentialism is 
humanism” [39] as well as any link of his own doctrine (or 
“thinking”) to existentialism and even “Sein und Zeit” later as 
far as it allowed of existentialist interpretations [28].  
Consequently, theology or at least Christian theology 
conserves the problem of those borders but interprets it in 
terms of the relation of human being and God. Heidegger’s 
term “ontotheology” [40] meant probably the same 
conservation, but as incoherent to his own thinking.  
In fact, Heidegger’s doctrine originated from Husserl’s 
phenomenology rather than from Greek pre-Socratic 
philosophy immediately. Husserl’s approach “bracketed” 
reality to reach the “phenomena” of consciousness. Thus, the 
question itself, about the borders of consciousness, turns out 
to be “bracketed”, and the “phenomena” in Husserl’s sense 
are invariant to the transformation “inside – outside” of 
consciousness. The question of those borders is rather 
meaningless as to the “phenomena” [41]. Then Heidegger’s 
step is to interpret those invariant “phenomena” as being 
rather than as consciousness. Being is not existence, but 
invariant to existence and thus to human being. 
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Husserl himself interpreted his own doctrine in different 
periods by means of Brentano’s (or scholastic) intentionality 
[5], [42] of consciousness, of Descartes’s apodictic 
consciousness [43], [44] and of Kant’s transcendental 
consciousness [7] (and even of solipsism and “egology” [43] 
eventually interpreted as transcendental). Christian theology 
seems to be much more tolerant to Husserl than to Heidegger 
[46]. [47] One can generalize that Husserl remains always 
within consciousness, though expands it in a way to include 
the world. [48]  
However, another interpretation of Husserl’s 
phenomenology never shared by him himself might be 
grounded on mathematical cognition [49], [50] for he was a 
mathematician in education and early carrier. Indeed, 
mathematics is what has “bracketed” and always “brackets” 
reality being invariant to it. The mathematical abstractions are 
always “eidetic reductions” consistent to both reality and 
possibility. Further, eidetic reduction can be generalized to 
“phenomenological reduction” and “transcendental reduction” 
and include all contents of consciousness. Thus, first, 
psychology and then philosophy seem to be formulable as 
“strenge Wissenschaft” as mathematics. From that viewpoint, 
Husserl’s doctrine might be classed as a form of neo-
Pythagoreanism, say “transcendental Pythagoreanism”.  
In turn, that reading of Husserl’s phenomenology can be 
applied to Heidegger’s doctrine in a way to make the latter 
even still more radical. That thinking might be illustrated as a 
continuation in Heidegger’s return to the origin of philosophy. 
Indeed, Heidegger did not include the Pythagoreans among 
the pre-Socratics [51]. His “homecoming” of philosophy 
reaches the Word of Heraclitus but not the Number of 
Pythagoras. Before Socrates’s alleged overturn of being to 
human being, one might allege an earlier overturn of the 
Pythagorean Number to the Word of Heraclitus. Indeed, the 
Word and language presupposed understanding, the 
fundamental concept of philosophical or phenomenological 
hermeneutics invented or shared by Heidegger. If 
understanding is reduced further to human understanding, the 
reduction of being to human being is more than natural only 
after which the question of borders between the former and 
the latter might appear.  
The further return in the origin of philosophy from the 
Word to the Number would mean in turn further 
desubjectification, but further dehumanization, too. The Word 
suggests understanding and thus admits human understanding, 
but the Number needs not either. It substitutes understanding 
by calculation. The tendency for philosophy to become an 
exact science leads to dehumanization in the final analysis if it 
is consistent enough. Indeed, the problem about the borders of 
consciousness disappear in thin air after that consistency, but 
human being, humanism, and then even understanding, and 
the being itself disappear in turn in the same way. 
One can generalize that the problem of the borders of 
consciousness is among those problems which would be better 
not to be resolved rather then that they really cannot be 
resolved. The inconsistency of philosophy is fruitful. It allows 
of philosophy to be human philosophy just as understanding 
the human understanding, and ‘being’ to be restricted as the 
human being. Heidegger wrote about that “petitio principii” 
only which was able to allow of any science and even being to 
appear [29].  
One can remind that Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans had 
kept their doctrine in both strict confidence and seclusion 
accessible only to the chosen ones [52]. Maybe they believed 
that it contents truth too destroying for mankind. Nowadays, 
we are able to reconstruct that too dangerous truth as 
consistent dehumanization to digitalization whether correctly 
or incorrectly.               
    
3.  THE OBJECTIONS TO UNIVERSAL 
MATHEMAZATION 
There are a few main groups of explicit objections to 
mathematization of science along with implicit unacceptance 
and passive resistance, which can be extracted [53-62]:  
(1) Mathemazation cannot be universal in principle. 
Mathematics creates only a more or less successful model (if 
any) which is fundamentally different from reality. The 
difference between any mathematical model and reality is 
qualitative rather than quantitative. Thus, that difference is 
beyond the range of mathematics in definition.   
(2) Furthermore mathematization is not universal as a 
matter of fact. There are many sciences which do not admit 
any mathematization in principle. Some sciences such history 
or liberal arts study unique events, facts, or artefacts. They 
involve often human interpretation, values, and estimations. 
Mathematization is meaningless to them for it would deprive 
them of essence.  
(3) Other sciences such as psychology or sociology study 
human factor whether in an individual or in society. Human 
factor does not allow mathematization in principle. 
(4)  Mathematization in many sciences, e.g. such as 
history, social sciences, biology, and even chemistry, etc. refer 
to unessential and auxiliary features or subdomains. Thus the 
core of those scientific disciplines is untouched by 
mathematization. 
(5) Though possible in principle, mathematization in a 
fundamental sense is inconvenient for practical use. Engineer 
and applied sciences utilize often empirical and semi-
empirical functional dependences, which need not and are not 
connected to the correspondent fundamental sciences. The 
way to be deduced is often both unknown and never 
investigated. On the contrary, the attempts to be deduced 
simplified formulas for daily use from the fundamental 
equations met insurmountable issues, difficulties, obstacles 
and need groundless assumptions.  
(6) Though mathematization is successful and practically 
applicable, its use needs immense calculations, which are 
beyond the present options even of supercomputers or are 
non-value-added because of the calculation cost. 
(7) The mathematical models are unstable and deviate too 
considerably at slight deviations of the initial conditions  
(the “butterfly effect”).  
 (8) Though the universal or partial mathematization might 
be possible in principle, it is dehumanizing and thus harmful.                  
The list does not pretend to be exhausted. Its claim is only 
to hint the huge volume of objections to mathematization, on 
the one hand, and to situate the present proof for universal 
constructive mathemazability of science on that background, 
on the other hand.    
The proof does not refer to the group of objections (5), (6), 
(7), and (8) in any way. It touches the groups (2) and (3) only 
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indirectly. Its meaning should be properly related to (1) and 
(4), but even then only partly.  
Its sense in the background of those various objections may 
be described so: 
As far as any science is exhibited in natural language, it 
admits exhausted mathematization by certain mathematical 
structures. The point is the extension from the rather obvious 
fact as to the exhibition in rigorous notions and consistently to 
the exhibition in any text in natural language thus covering all 
sciences (all sciences are represented in natural languages, but 
only a small part of them is already mathematized).   
In other words, any text implies the option of 
mathematization rather than only any logically consistent text, 
in which the semantic units (such words) are well-defined as 
notions, and then well-ordered in syllogisms. This means that 
the difference between mathematics, called in Renaissance 
“Language of Nature” [53], and natural languages is neither 
fundamental nor even essential, but rather conventional.    
Quantum mechanics was the scientific domain, which first 
met contextuality as to the language of nature. Before that, 
contextuality featured only human language and even it was 
considered as its disadvantage, which had to be “cured” by 
exact notions and definitions and a correct and rigorous 
logical order.   
The overturn of common viewpoint for quantum 
mechanics was so drastic, unexpected, and sudden, that it was 
put “in quarantine”, so that its “ridiculous conclusions” to be 
restricted to it itself and “classified” by complex technical 
calculations. The philosophical interpretation of its 
mathematical formalism based on the complex Hilbert space 
ceased gradually to be tolerated. The understanding of what in 
fact quantum stated was substituted by experimentally testable 
applications of it without explanations of what they should 
mean.    
What forced quantum mechanics to so decisive steps was 
the necessity due to the existence of the fundamental natural 
Plank constant to find that kind of mathematical structure, 
which is invariant to the transformation between the discrete 
and continuous (usually even smooth) physical action. 
Classical mechanics is continuous (smooth). However, the 
Planck constant having the physical dimension of action, 
though exceptionally small, measures the action in quanta, i.e. 
by integers. The common explanation is that the actions in the 
Plank scale are discrete, but they seem as being continuous 
macroscopically for the exponent of the Planck constant is  
“– 34” to our daily measure units.  
In fact, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics 
speaks otherwise. What it says is known as “wave – particle 
duality”.  It implies that quantum motion is both discrete and 
continuous (smooth) simultaneously. Any representation 
challenges common sense. As a corollary, quantum mechanics 
was forced to equate subjective and objective probability and 
even the possible and actual physically (the so-called 
probabilistic or Born interpretation of wave function [63]).  
The “free will theorems” [64-65] can be deduced once both 
nonlocal formalism due to the complex Hilbert space and the 
local signaling for special relativity are granted 
simultaneously. Quantum mechanics is neither local nor non-
local. It is both local and nonlocal.  
As to the general problem of universal mathematization, 
two its conclusions are especially important: 
(1) The necessity to be equated the discrete and continuous 
(smooth) to each other implies furthermore canceling the 
purely qualitative difference of model and reality. If quantum 
mechanics is true (as it seems to be), model and reality might 
coincide in particular, and the difference between them is both 
only quantitative sharing the mathematical formalism and 
qualitative as a mathematical formalism and as a separated 
reality simultaneously and in general [66]. That conclusion 
contradicts immediately to the objection (1) above.  
(2) Quantum mechanics implies contextuality as to the 
language of nature [67]. Human language and the language of 
nature as what mathematics has accepted since the age of 
Galileo and Newton cannot be distinguished from each other 
for that identifier. Thus a huge obstacle for mathematics to 
penetrate all human knowledge is removed. 
Still one objection, which can be added, refers to explicit 
Husserl’s criticism to “Galilean mathematization” in one of 
the last works published in his lifetime, “The crisis of 
European sciences and transcendental philosophy; an 
introduction to phenomenology” [68], [56]. As if Husserl 
himself rejects universal mathematization even as one of the 
sources of “the crisis of European sciences”. Consequently, 
any “mathematizing” interpretation of his phenomenology 
should be refused in turn, too.  
Two main considerations on his criticism can be 
mentioned: 
(1) Husserl criticized the universal substitution of qualities 
by quantities as naturalizing mathematization. Thus, what was 
meant was just Galilean mathematization rather than 
mathematization in general.  
Mathematization had been done incorrectly since the age of 
Galileo being linked to naturalization and sensual qualities. 
One can suggest implicitly another mathematization grounded 
on “epoché” rather than on naturalization for mathematics 
really abstains from the statement of reality. Consequently, 
the adequate mathematization should be based on the 
approach of mathematics rather than on that strange 
assumption of reality external to mathematics.  
(2) The criticism to “Galilean mathematization” should be 
seen as coherent and consistent to all other works of Husserl 
rather than opposed to them. He extended the approach of 
mathematics for abstaining of reality to those sciences such as 
psychology and philosophy, which should not presuppose 
reality, for the reality itself is their object and subject and a 
kind of petitio principii appeares.         
4. THE PROOF OF THE STATEMENT   
The statement is: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to 
some mathematical structure in a way constructive (that is not 
as a proof of “pure existence” in a mathematical sense). 
The statement needs a few preliminary elucidations. 
(1) In fact, what will be proved is that any scientific theory, 
which is exhibited in natural language, admits that 
isomorphism constructively. One can object that a wider set of 
texts including the scientific theories allows of 
mathematization. This seems to be namely so. However, the 
question about which texts are scientific theories [69] is rather 
difficult to be answered unambiguously.  
Nevertheless, any scientific theory is a text otherwise  
a counterexample might be demonstrated. This means that the 
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following arguments as a sketch of proof can be considered as 
an implicit definition about that wider set of texts including 
the scientific theories: those texts which ate a true part of 
more extended texts and thus refer to nonempty contexts. That 
kind of definition forbids only the consideration of any text 
claiming to be scientific as universal, i.e. without any context. 
It is similar to Zermelo’s way out from the paradoxes in set 
theory [70]: any set is a true subset of another, and if not it is 
not a set. No scientific text is a universal dogma, which is 
always valid independently of its context and therefore 
corresponds to Poper’s criterion [71] not to be 
“metaphysical”.   
(2) The sketch of the proof can be divided into three cases, 
which are rather unequal in a mathematical sense. The first 
two ones are almost obvious and they need not to be proved, 
or in other words, their proof is “trivial”. Nevertheless, their 
interpretation including philosophical interpretation is not less 
important than that of the third case properly needing a 
mathematical proof. 
(3) The term ‘theory’ is used rather in an internal sense 
than in an external sense. This means that the question about 
their confirmation in reality by experience or experiments is 
“bracketed” in a phenomenological manner. Consequently,  
the term should include also hypotheses still yet neither 
corroborated nor rejected as well as even old, already refused 
hypotheses.  
(4) The first case is that of a classical theory exhibited 
consistently, i.e. by well-defined notions well-ordered in 
syllogisms. A mathematical theory deduced from a complete 
and consistent set of axiom can be considered as the “ideal 
case” (in the sense of Max Weber’s “idealtypus” [72]) of that 
first case. Of course, a mathematical theory does not need any 
additional mathematization for it is mathematized in 
definition. All theories of the first case are differed slightly 
from their ideal case.  
The term “slightly” as it is used above needs a more certain 
justification. “Slightly” is used in relation to the degree of 
separation of the theoretical text from its context as well as to 
those degrees as to the notions or postulates (principles) inside 
the text itself.  The ideal case corresponds to absolute 
separation. One might argue even that the ideal case of 
scientific theory is not a scientific theory for it does not have 
any context in fact after it can be absolutely separated from its 
context. However, this does not contradict to Weber’s concept 
of idealtypus [72].  
This means that the text is a whole in isolation from and 
independent of its context. The same refers to its notions to all 
rest ones. If the text at issue is taken out of its natural context, 
in which it has appeared initially, and incorporated to other 
relevant context, its meaning will not be changed.  
In fact, that in the sense of absolute independence can be 
hardly referred even to a present mathematical theory. As the 
discussion of the third case will show, those absolutely 
“acontextual” theories do not exist in principle just as any 
quantum system, what any physical entities is, cannot be 
separated absolutely from its environment in virtue of the 
Kochen – Specker theorem [67]. The meant “ideal case” is 
unachievable by any real theory even by a mathematical one. 
The term “slightly” can be anyway described as to practical 
use by the model of a mathematical theory, in which can miss 
some notions or axioms as well as the proof of completeness 
and consistency including the mutual independence of its 
axioms. Euclid’s geometry can be a great example of using 
“slightly” relevantly. Indeed, it had been the standard of how  
a scientific theory should look like throughout many centuries 
and even millennia. That standard turns out to be too high 
even nowadays for many sciences out of the scope of the 
exact ones. 
Besides being preliminary almost mathematized at least 
implicitly as slightly differing from its ideal type, any theory 
falling within the first case can be considered as the intension 
of an extended notion or as the definition of that notion. Thus 
it can be directly defined in terms of information in the sense 
of Piers [73]: any theory, of course being furthermore a 
“sign”, should not be “an icon” conveying information about 
everything or nothing [74]. The applicability of Peirce’s 
“information” is quite natural after its definition of “state of 
information” [74] almost coincides with a result after 
Husserl’s eidetic reduction.  
Though its explicit extension can comprise infinitely many 
individuals, the intension can be always chosen to be finite. 
This corresponds to the principle of abstraction [1] as to set 
theory: any infinite set can be described by a relevant property 
expressible finitely. 
Being representable as a set, it is both unambiguously 
distinguished from its environment, and its elements from 
each other. One can say that the first case is well-modelable in 
terms of set theory. This is not surprising at all for one of the 
natural contexts, in which the set theory itself appeared, was 
that of that kind of theories.  
(5) Unlike the first case, the second case does not offer 
historical and even only natural interpretation. It should be 
involved for the distinction of the constructive from non-
constructive mathematization.  
If both, an arbitrary text and the axiom of choice are given, 
a finite set as those in the first case and equivalent to the text 
has to exist but only “purely and mathematically”. This means 
that finite set in question cannot be demonstrated in principle 
as one and the same in any way. That pure existence as any 
pure existence in mathematics is useless for practice. That text 
is mathematizable in principle, but nobody knows how. Even 
the corresponding equivalent mathematical form might be 
provably inexpressible explicitly.  
Nevertheless, that second case hints the method, in which 
the practically significant third case might be researched and 
proved.         
 That existence in the second case is grounded on Skolem’s 
relativity of the concept of set (1922) after the axiom of 
choice [22], also known as Skolem’s paradox. 
Indeed, let us admit that any text doubtlessly being finite 
anyway can be represented as a certain set though infinite in 
general. (That assumption will be discussed and justified  
a little later.)  After the axiom of choice is given, it can be 
well-ordered and therefore enumerated, i.e. a natural number 
can be attached unambiguously to each one element of the set. 
Peano arithmetic [75] implies that any natural number is 
finite. Indeed, 1 is finite; adding 1 to any finite number, one 
obtains a finite number again; then, all natural numbers are 
finite according to the axiom of induction. One can obtain 
infinite natural numbers only if the existence of at least one 
infinite natural number is postulated. However, there is not 
such an axiom, at least among Peano’s.  
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Then, the set in question, after having been well-ordered, is 
furthermore enumerated by successive finite numbers. It is 
possible only if it itself is a finite set. Summarizing, the axiom 
of choice and Peano arithmetic imply that any infinite set can 
be enumerated and therefore mapped one-to-one by a certain 
finite set equivalent to a certain initial segment of natural 
numbers. It was just still Thoralf Skolem (1922) who pointed 
out expressively that concept of ‘set’ is relative even to the 
distinction “finiteness – infinity” [22] after the two 
assumptions. 
However, that corresponding finite set exists only purely: it 
cannot be demonstrated explicitly ever in principle once the 
axiom of choice is utilized. 
That pure existence might be equated to the random choice 
of an initial segment of natural numbers. That additional 
assumption seems to be consistent to the first two ones after 
one of them is just the axiom of choice [76]. Furthermore, 
though the corresponding finite set is randomly chosen after 
each one experiment for that set to be attached to an infinite 
set, one can admit that the probability distribution for some 
finite set to be attached to a certain infinite set is 
unambiguously determined. 
The latter two additional assumptions though unnecessary 
for the correspondence between finite and infinite sets (the 
former two ones are sufficient) allow of unambiguously 
linking of a probability distribution to each infinite set [77].  
The initial assumption that any text can be represented as 
an equivalent set infinite in general will be discussed now. If 
it is granted, one can trace the pathway for universal though 
yet nonconstructive mathematization. However, it seems just 
like petitio principii for set theory is the ground of 
mathematics. 
If any theory being a text in general is declared to be a set, 
this presupposes already the principle of universal 
mathematization. 
The same consideration refers to the discussion of the first 
case, too. There, any theory differs slightly from the ideal 
type, which is postulated to be that of mathematical theory. If 
it is granted, it seems to be obvious that theory should be 
mathematizable. 
The same kind of petitio principii will be referable after the 
discussion of the third case a little later. Then, the question 
about what is the meaning and value of such a principle of 
universal mathemazibility and its proof is natural.  
If one presupposes that any scientific theory is 
mathematizable, it turns out to be just that. 
Its meaning and value might be interpreted as follows. One 
can postulate and therefore choose that universal 
mathemazibility or not. If the former is the case, there is a 
certain relevant mathematical structure, which can be found.  
Nonetheless, one can choose not to mathematize the theory 
at issue. Consequently, the proof is able only to demonstrate 
that principle is independent and eventually consistent to 
human cognition and its ground.  
One can compare the situation with the discovery of non-
Euclidean geometry [78]. One can accept a certain negation of 
Euclid’s fifth postulate searching for any contradiction and 
therefore for a proof of the fifth postulate by reduction ad 
absurdum. However, that contradiction is not found. Even 
more, one can construct a model of non-Euclidean geometry 
inside in the Euclidean geometry itself. Consequently, the 
consistency of Euclidean geometry implies the consistency of 
non-Euclidean geometry, too. 
Analogically, the principle of mathematizability says: the 
consistency of any scientific theory implies the consistency of 
its mathematized build; the choices to mathematize or not are 
both acceptable and equally consistent.   
Nobody is forced to mathematize. This is a free choice, 
which is justifiable.  
(6) The third case, the properly mathematically interesting 
one, refers to the addition of constructiveness in a consistent 
way to the second case discussed just above. This needs 
Husserl’s fundamental and philosophical considerations about 
reality and “phenomenon” in his sense explicitly. 
Furthermore, one has to interpret them in terms of Peano 
arithmetic and apply to set theory. 
The introduction of the kinds of reductions in his sense is 
crucial. Those are: “eidetic reduction”, “phenomenological 
reduction”, and “transcendental reduction”. He declared that 
all the three share one and the same meaning3 utilized in three 
different contexts: correspondingly mathematics, psychology 
and philosophy. Those three ones share furthermore a special 
attitude to reality, which is not the natural one, for it itself as a 
whole is a subject of research. Consequently, its existence 
cannot be presupposed as mankind and all other sciences have 
always done. That “natural attitude” is to be “bracketed” as to 
the range of each of them. Thus both psychology and 
philosophy might be transformed into “rigorous sciences” 
what mathematics is. 
The present paper can be interpreted as an approach to the 
generalization of Husserl’s idea from the scope of psychology 
and philosophy to that including any scientific theory. The 
latter can be always mathematized in a constructive way and 
thus transformed into a “rigorous scientific theory” if one 
wishes. 
Husserl’s terms “epoché” and “bracketing” [7, 9] serve to 
express that nonstandard attitude to reality. It is not rejected if 
one utilizes those terms. It is neither rejected nor accepted. 
The problem of reality is remained open to be possible its 
research by scientific methods. After that problem is 
presupposedly open, one can investigate what remains just by 
a kind of reduction certain according to the corresponding 
domain: mathematics, psychology, or philosophy. Until 
Husserl, the method had been explicitly developed only in 
mathematics.  
Its essence is given in Husserl’s manner of thought by the 
concept of eidetic reduction [7], [79]. One can remove one by 
one the properties of anything questioning after each one 
removing whether the investigated thing continues to be the 
same. If yes, the process continues by the next removing, and 
if not, the last removing is cancelled, i.e. the process is 
returned to the immediately antecedent state, and the property 
at issue is enlisted into the eidos of the thing4. Then the 
process continues as initially. 
The most essential feature of that algorithmic procedure is 
its constructiveness as to the present consideration. One will 
                                                 
3 Here “meaning” is used as Frege’s “Bedeutung” [30], but not as 
reference or referent. The latter is inacceptable for reality should not 
be presupposed. 
4 Which corresponds to the state of information of that thing in Peirce 
[74]. 
10 
 
obtain the eidos of the investigated thing as an ultimate and 
unambiguous result. 
That thing will turn out to be axiomatized as to 
mathematics. It can be exhaustedly restored deductively from 
its axioms and any of its properties will be proved as a 
theorem.  
However, a finite set of properties can distinguish only a 
finite set of individuals. Consequently, if the set of individuals 
is infinite, as usual in mathematics, it needs a set of property, 
which cannot be finite, for the set of all subsets of any finite 
set is finite in turn.  
Furthermore, if the above procedure is represented by 
Peano arithmetic, there is no guarantee that it can be 
accomplished. The thing has an infinite set of properties for it 
is defined in set theory. However, Peano arithmetic does not 
include infinite natural numbers for the axiom of induction, as 
this is demonstrated above. The procedure is representable in 
Paeno arithmetic, but it refers to set theory. The former does 
not include infinity, and the latter does. The only consistent 
way out is that the procedure will not finish to be able to 
reconcile finiteness to infinity. 
That way out is not relevant as to the discussed procedure 
for the eidos of the anything to be obtained.  
One needs to postulate the existence of at least one infinite 
natural number and therefore to generalize Peano arithmetic 
and axioms. The same postulate is historically equivalently 
realized by the concept and axiom of transfinite induction [80] 
generalizing those of induction in Peano arithmetic [81].  
Indeed, the transfinite induction replaced that of induction 
in Peano arithmetic allows of resolving the problem of 
reconciling arithmetic, set theory, and the discussed procedure 
for obtaining eidos consistently. The transfinite induction 
implies the existence of natural numbers, which are not finite 
as well as that the procedure referring to an infinite set of 
properties is able to finish. 
The case where the procedure cannot finish corresponds to 
Gödel’s “undecidable statements” (1931) [82] for they appear 
also on the boundary between Peano arithmetic and set theory. 
Indeed, the former does not admit infinity unlike the latter, 
and the only way to reconciled consistently to each other is 
the existence of those statement, the resolving of which 
cannot finish. 
On the contrary, they disappear into thin air after transfinite 
induction has been applied as in Gentzen’s proof (1936) [80, 
83], which is also coherent with the consideration just above.    
Husserl’s approach for “bracketing reality” also leads to an 
equivalent of transfinite induction once it is interpreted in 
terms of arithmetic and set theory. Here is how: 
There are two disjunctive options: to “bracket reality” or 
not; this corresponds to adding a single bit with two values: 
“consciousness” and “reality”. If that bit has not been added at 
all, this is a “phenomenon”, which is equally relevant to both 
consciousness and reality. Of course, that extremely 
simplified scheme is necessary only for the interpretation in 
terms of arithmetic, which by itself is too simple. 
One can summarize that only a single bit to be always 
addable is sufficient. However, the so-called function 
successor within the framework of Peano arithmetic as if 
guarantees the same, and this is not enough. In fact, the 
additional bit, meaning the bracketing of reality as a whole, 
should refer to the Peano arithmetic itself as a whole. So, the 
additional bit does not double any natural number, but doubles 
the set of all natural numbers given by the Peano axioms and 
thus generates a second Peano arithmetic absolutely 
independent of the first one though identical to it. 
Then, the latter can be interpreted as the “arithmetic of 
infinity”. The Peano axiom of induction is absolutely enough 
within each of them, but irrelevant as to the transition between 
them. That transition needs transfinite induction.  
As the elucidated link from the additional bit to transfinite 
induction is a chain of equivalencies, the reversion from 
transfinite induction to an additional bit in the sense above is 
valid, too.  
This accomplishes the sketch of the proof in the third case. 
That arithmetical model of reality also excludes the Gödel 
undecidable statements in Gentzen’s manner [80].  
One can utilize the term “Gödel mathematic” if the 
principle of universal mathematizability is not accepted and 
there are statements which cannot be resolved. They would 
correspond to non-mathematizible scientific theories. 
For the Hilbert program [84] of how mathematics might 
self-found itself, one can call that kind of mathematic, where 
the principle of universal mathematizablity is valid, “Hilbert 
mathematic”. There are not undecidable statements or non-
mathematizable scientific theories in it for Gentzen’s proof 
[80, 83]. 
The ontological status of the two kinds of mathematics is 
quite different: 
The Gödel mathematics corresponds to Husserl’s “natural 
attitude” to reality. It exists as external and qualitatively 
different from mathematics. It is consistent to the most 
philosophies of mathematics.  
The Hilbert mathematics would correspond to Husserl’s 
“epoché” to reality. It is able to include reality within itself. 
The kinds of Pythagoreanism would be the most relevant to it.  
The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent 
to Hilbert mathematics. As in relation to the principle, anyone 
is free to choose between Gödel mathematics and Hulbert 
mathematics. Whatever would be the choice both alternatives 
are consistent and justifiable.  
5. THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
The philosophical interpretation of the principle was touched 
many times above in the corresponding link to concrete 
questions. 
There is still one way of interpretation if one would like to 
elucidate which mathematics is more relevant to our being5: 
whether Gödel mathematics or Hilbert mathematics. It should 
deduce the “elements of being”6 in each case.  
The answer as to Gödel mathematics is well investigated: 
mathematics and reality does not share common elements: the 
                                                 
5 Here is used the term “being” in a fundamental and philosophical 
sense for the usual terms of that kind, such as “the world” or “reality”, 
make sense only in the context of the first alternative, that of Gödel 
mathematics. So, their utilization is irrelevant if the problem at issue 
is to be discussed without bias. 
6 Those can be thought as a kind of reminiscence of Einstein, 
Podolsky, Rosen’s “element of reality” [85] in a quite different, and 
even opposite context. 
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ones, in mathematics, are ideal and the others, in reality, right 
real. Different degree of correspondence between them as well 
as various hypotheses or theories can be admitted, however 
they are always two fundamentally different types even in the 
cases where the one type is suggested to be reducible to the 
other.  
As to Hilbert mathematics, the problem is not yet 
researched. Here is an approach outlined: 
The three cases in the sketch of proof above correspond to 
finite set, infinite set non-constructively, and infinite set 
constructively. The first and third cases can be unified as 
constructive (any finite set is trivially constructive), and 
opposed to the second one, right non-constructive.  
The sketched way of proof in the case of constructiveness 
refers to arithmetic whether the Peano one (the first case) or 
the one generalized by transfinite induction (and equivalent to 
two Peano aritmetics).   
Discussing the second case above, that of non-
constructiveness, two last assumptions were made at the end:  
(1) Pure existence might be equated to the random choice 
of an initial segment of natural numbers.  
(2) Probability distribution for some finite set to be 
attached to a certain infinite set features unambiguously the 
certain infinite set. 
They trace an alternative way for that constructiveness to 
infinite sets, which does not need arithmetic, the well-ordering 
principle and the axiom of choice in the final analysis, though 
the way was above pioneered by means of the latter two ones. 
Its essence consists in “bracketing” finiteness as follows: 
The transition from any infinite set to a randomly 
corresponding finite initial segment of the natural numbers 
needs indeed the axiom of choice. However, once the 
corresponding probability distribution is constructed, it can be 
postulated as corresponding to the infinite set at issue. Then 
the transition from one infinite set to any other one is an 
operator of probability distributions, which does not need the 
axiom of choice at all.     
The relation of infinity to finiteness, though being 
fundamentally random, is involved indirectly, by its ultimate 
result of a certain probability distribution, the transformation 
of which is not random anymore in turn. This is meant as 
“bracketing finiteness”: it differs from ignoring finiteness. If 
the latter was the case, infinity might be treated as a second 
finiteness as after exploring a second Peano arithmetic for 
transfinite induction, but indistinguishable from the first one.  
One remains in the transformations of only infinite sets, 
however determinable unambiguously to the finiteness as a 
whole right by the probability distributions. 
So, two ways of representing infinity sets may be 
distinguished accordingly. The one is grounded on probability 
distributions, the other on arithmetic generalized relevantly. 
One can suggest that both approaches should be equivalent 
to each other, and even that the one can be referred to 
“reality” and the other to “mathematics” if need be for 
comparing with “Gödel mathematics”.  
In turn, the utilization of probability distributions can 
significantly facilitate elaborating mathematized builds of 
scientific theories if the above equivalence holds.  
If any well-confirmed and fundamental scientific fact can 
be considered as an interpretation of that equivalence, it will 
be in favor of the hypothesis of Hilbert mathematics as to our 
being.  
At last, that universal kind of elements shared by both 
mathematics and reality in Hilbert mathematics coincides with 
the concept and quantity of information. 
Indeed, Peano arithmetic can be interpreted as a universal 
Turing machine processing a tape consisting of bits, i.e. of the 
elementary units of information. Any real computer can be 
modeled as a Turing machine, which “tape” is always finite if 
the computer can finish its work. This corresponds to the case 
of Peano arithmetic.  
Its generalization as above for transfinite induction needs a 
corresponding generalization of Turing machine: the 
introduction of results calculable by transfinite “tapes” is 
sufficient. No real computer existing until now can be 
modeled as having that “transfinite tape” 
The case of probability distributions can be represented as  
a quantum Turing machine processing qubits rather than bits 
and a tape, in which all bits are replaced by qubits. A qubit is 
defined in quantum mechanics and theory of quantum 
information as the normed superposition of two orthogonal 
subspaces of the complex Hilbert space. Thus, the complex 
Hilbert space itself can be represented as the tape of the 
quantum computer, in which different wave functions 
(interpretable as the states of physical systems) are processed. 
A qubit can be considered as that generalization of a bit, 
which refers to an infinite series or to an infinite set of 
alternatives just as a standard bit is defined as the choice 
between two equally probable alternatives.   
The corresponding kind of information is quantum 
information. Indeed, the wave functions processed by  
the quantum Turing machine can be interpreted as the 
characteristic functions of those probability distributions 
specifying the corresponding infinite sets at issue. 
Consequently, a kind of information is what is (i.e. the 
being) in all cases. Information can be represented as a finite 
series of bits, as a transfinite series of bits, or as a series of 
qubits. 
Where Hilbert mathematics is valid, all is information.              
6. AN EXAMPLE OF USE 
As this is demonstrated above, there are three “kinds” of 
information and their corresponding units: bits, transfinite bits 
(i.e. bits in transfinite positions or in other words, those 
corresponding to the second Peano arithmetic), and qubits. 
The option of being equated to each other is natural for 
Hilbert mathematics, but anyway consistent with Gödel 
mathematics. The difference between the two cases is rather 
philosophical and interpretational than formal: 
If Hilbert mathematics is the case, information is one 
single, and the kinds of information are identical in definitions 
though expressed differently. However, the kinds of 
information are different in definition as to Gödel 
mathematics, but they might be equated to each other 
occasionally. 
Consequently, any corroboration in favour of each of them 
needs the distinction whether the case of information equation 
is fundamental or partial and thus depends again on the a 
priori philosophical framework of interpretation. 
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For example, if a fundamental equation in quantum 
mechanics such as the Schrödinger equation is interpreted as 
an information equation successfully, the question whether it 
is in favour of Hilbert mathematics depends on whether the 
quantum mechanics itself is accepted as fundamental. For it is 
only a science among many others, it cannot be privileged. 
For any entity is a quantum system, it is fundamental. 
However, even in the latter case, the fundamentality of 
quantum mechanics might be accepted only as to all physical 
entities and rejected as to mathematics. 
We met again the necessity of “petitio prinicipii”: The 
choice between Hilbert mathematics or Gödel mathematics 
seems to be presupposed even to our being. Each of them is 
postulable, but none of them is preferable or rejectable. 
Anyway, the existence of reasons to be preferred the one, 
though unknown until now, cannot be also refused. 
Indeed, the Schrödinger equation is not too difficult to be 
interpreted in terms of an information equation in the sense 
above: 
(1) The Planck constant might equate the physical 
quantity of action to information, for the latter is physically 
dimensionless and possesses a natural quant, a bit: the 
quantity of information cannot be less than a bit ever. 
(2) Since transfinite series are used, the physical action 
of those would turn out to be also transfinite and thus 
inconvenient immediately. One should utilize the physical 
action per a unit of the length of series. The corresponding 
physical quantity might be identified as ‘time’, and the 
physical action per a unit of series as ‘energy’. Indeed, the 
Schrödinger equation is dimensioned in energy and thus refers 
to the equation of energies. Consequently, that fact is also 
consistent to the interpretation of the Schrödinger equation as 
an information equation.  
(3) The transfinite segments of bits per a unit of segment 
should not be distinguishable from the finite ones. 
Consequently, the utilization of energy identifies the cases of 
bits and transfinite bits. One can speak of bits generally 
meaning both classical and transfinite bits once their energy 
equivalent is used. 
(4) The Schrödinger equation compares a kind of energy in 
its left part to the sum of two kinds of energy in its right part. 
These two kinds of energy in the right part correspond to the 
kinetic and potential energy in classical mechanics, and their 
sum to the total mechanic energy. The left part is dimensioned 
as energy, too, but it has not any correspondence in classical 
mechanics.  
(5) That new kind of energy is proportional to the first time 
derivative of the wave function. The wave function itself can 
be considered as the characteristic function of a probability 
distribution and thus attachable to a certain infinite set as 
above. According to the equivalency of the kinds of 
information, the same infinite set can be represented by a 
transfinite series, and its time derivative interpreted 
accordingly as the energy of a transfinite bit or a bit for (3) 
above in the final analysis. 
(6) A qubit is isomorphic to a usual 3D unit ball, in which 
two points are chosen: the one within the ball, the other on its 
surface (which is a unit 3D sphere). Furthermore, the latter 
point has to be on the circle which is perpendicular to  
the straight line, determined by both centre of the ball and 
former point.  Then, that unit ball with two points chosen can 
be interpreted as a space ball in Minkowski space-time for 
some moment 𝑡𝑡 and with a radius 𝑐𝑐. 𝑡𝑡 (𝑐𝑐 is the velocity of light 
in vacuum). 
(7) Any qubit depends on the square of space distance after 
the construction in (6), and its change would correspond to  
the second derivative of space distance. This is consistent both 
to the interpretation of information as action in (1) and to the 
operator (∇2) of kinetic energy in the right part of  
the Schrödinger equation. 
(8) If the consideration is restricted to a qubit rather than to 
its change as in (7), the qubit determines a position in space  
(the space ball defined as above). That position can be 
interpreted as the argument of the function of potential 
energy, which is the other member in the sum of total 
mechanic energy in the right part of the Schrödinger equation.  
(9) Meaning the algebraic signs in the Schrödinger 
equation, one can summarize a purely informational 
interpretation of it: the energy of a qubit is equal to the sum of 
the change of the energy of that qubit and the energy of the 
equivalent bit according the generalized sense of ‘bit’ in (3). 
In other words, the difference of information expressed in 
qubits and in bits is equal to its change (expressed in qubits) 
after information (action) is relevantly transformed in energy 
(action per a unit of time). 
Though the Schrödinger equation admits a pure 
informational interpretation as above, it is consistent anyway 
to the hypothesis for Gödel mathematics separating 
mathematics from reality. To reject the latter, one should 
manage to demonstrate somehow that wave function can be 
attached to consciousness as well7, and the Schrödinger 
equation expresses in fact the fundamental relation of 
consciousness and reality or even a more fundamental 
essence. That more fundamental essence might be identity of 
any entity as a whole or as consisting of parts just right 
another idea of Husserl: the formal doctrine about parts and 
whole: Division 3 in Volume 2 of “Logical Investigations” 
[5], [88]. 
The problem of quantum mechanics to unify the discrete 
and continuous motions and that of philosophy to unify the 
discrete leap between consciousness and reality and 
continuous transition between them seem to share simile and 
even maybe one and the same structure expressible 
informationally by the Schrödinger equation. 
7. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The principle of universal mathematizability refers to any 
scientific theory as it is always exhibited in a natural language 
as a text. Even the texts of a more extended class are 
mathematizable, but this is out of the scope of the present 
consideration. The term of scientific theory is used in the 
sense of internal consistency of the text and thus includes not 
only the theories confirmed by experience and experiments, 
but also all scientific hypotheses not yet corroborated or 
already rejected. 
                                                 
7 All conceptions of “quantum mind” [86], [87] imply the same or 
similar of that. 
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 The principle states that both a relevant and exhausted 
mathematical structure can be chosen for any scientific theory 
and that choice can be constructive. 
Investigating an eventual sketch for proving it, a series of 
interesting circumstances appear: 
First of all, the principle seems to be rather a most 
fundamental axiom referring to the relation of mathematics 
and reality. Consequently, it cannot be proved or refused in a 
proper sense. What is possible is to be demonstrated that it 
does not lead to any contradiction or to construct a model of 
the mathematics accepting it in the mathematics rejecting it. 
The way is by means of elucidating the mismatch of 
(Peano) arithmetic and set theory in relation to infinity in the 
foundation of mathematics. Peano arithmetic does not admit 
infinite natural number unlike set theory postulating infinite 
sets. Gödel unresolvable statements appear of the stick 
between them. 
Further, one can show that any statement of that kind 
correspond to some non-mathematizable scientific theory. 
Therefore, the principle of universal mathematizabilty is 
inconsistent to the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) 
[82]. Anyway, it has already demonstrated that Gödel proof 
implicitly accepts reality external to mathematics, and the 
existence of unresolvable statements is not more than a new, 
but equivalent expression of that assumption, which is right 
modelled by the relation of Peano arithmetic and set theory.  
The mentioned relevant historical fact allows for the 
metamathematical postulate about reality as external to 
mathematics to be assigned to those theorems, and the kind of 
mathematics sharing it to be called Gödel mathematics.  
On the contrary, if Peano arithmetic is generalized by 
replacing the axiom of induction by that of transfinite 
induction, the mismatch in question disappear as well as  
the Gödel unresolvable statement as Gentzen’s proof (1936) 
[80,83] can be interpreted in particular. 
The present paper follows another pathway grounded on 
Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve 
the generalized arithmetic equivalent to that just above and 
necessary for the principle to be founded in alternative 
ontology, in which there is no reality external to mathematics, 
but reality is included within mathematics. That latter 
mathematics is able to self-found itself and can be called 
Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert’s program for self-
founding mathematics on the base of arithmetic. 
The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent 
to Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. 
Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the 
problem which of the two mathematics refers to our being; 
and vice versa: the choice between them for different reasons 
would confirm or refuse the principle as to the being. 
A few directions for future work can be: 
(1) A rigorous formal proof of the principle as an 
independent axiom. 
(2) The further development of information ontology 
consistent to both kinds of mathematics, but much 
more natural for Hilbert mathematics. 
(3) The development of the information interpretation 
of quantum mechanics as a mathematical one for 
information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics. 
(4) The description of consciousness in terms of 
information ontology.      
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